The Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul: Was the rapprochement helpful for the minority?’’
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Even thought the Greek Orthodox
minority of Istanbul received a series of guarantees from the Lausanne Treaty
of 1923, several events since the 1930’s (mostly linked to Cyprus) led to the
diminishing of the community from almost 140,000 people in 1923 to less than
2,000-3,000 today. Turkey, with a series of laws took measures against the
community by preventing Greeks from exercising specific trades and professions[1].
The most important measures were the 1932 parliamentary law and the 1942 Whealthy Levy[2]
(Varlik Vergisi). However, it is of no doubt that the most catastrophic moments
in the minority’s modern history were the Pogrom in September 1955 and the
1964-65 deportation of the Greek citizens of Istanbul. After these events the
minority was shrunken to less than 3,000 today.
It is also important to stress that several measures were token in
Imvros and Tenedos as well, which resulted to the actual destruction of the
Greek communities which were predominant in these islands in 1923[3].
St. George's Church- Ferer, Istanbul.
As for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is supposed to be the ‘spiritual guide’ of the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul under the Lausanne Treaty, three are the major problems: the first one is the Holy Theological School in Halki (Heybeliada) which was shut down in 1971 and since then the Patriarchate calls for its re-opening. The actual problem which arises is that the Theological School is vital for the Patriarchate to exist, since there it can trains its clergy. Furthermore, since the Turkish law demands that the Patriarch has to be Turkish citizen by birth it can be assumed that with the Halki School closed it is impossible for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to train its prospective Patriarchs. The second major problem is found in Turkey’s denial of a legal personality for the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The imminent effect of this denial is that actually the Patriarchate has no ownership rights. Furthermore,according to a 1974 Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals (Yargitay) decision, the Turkish state does not recognize properties which have been donated after 1936 to religious foundations and whose constitutive document does not explicitly mention the right to acquire property.Also, many Greek Orthodox cemeteries are being ruled by the Turkish local authorities in violation of the Lausanne Treaty (Article 42) and pursuant to Article 160 of the Law on Local Government. Finally, the last problem which the Ecumenical Patriarchate faces is the non-recognition of the Patriarchates ecumenical nature by the Turkish authorities. Turkey suggests that the Patriarchate in Istanbul serves only the Greeks of Turkey and terms such as ecumenical are threatening the sovereignty and the laicité of the Turkish state. However the term ecumenical is not related to politics. It is a clear spiritual and religious title which was given to the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Istanbul) during the 6 century A.D. The peculiarity of the Turkish refusal is that the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate is been recognized worldwide and the bishop whom they regard as a local is recognized as the spiritual leader of more than 300,000,000 Orthodox Christians around the world. In terms of operation, the refusal of its ecumenicity prevents the Patriarchate from accepting deacons from outside of Turkey who can permanently work and settle themselves in Turkey.Consequences from the rapprochement for the minority in Istanbul
As we have seen, the rapprochement process between the two countries helped a lot to the creation of a more ‘constructive’ environment in order to reach a final settlement in the bilateral problems. Regarding the ‘stricto sensu’ minority problems we can see that things do not seem to have been better for the Greek minority in Istanbul. The problems are still there, and the fact that Turkey treats the Greek minority in Istanbul under a mindset of reciprocity of the Greek state towards the Muslim minority in Greece leads is heavily paradoxical. The reason I am suggesting this is that minority members in Istanbul are Turkish citizens of Greek origin and therefore Turkey shouldn’t demand ‘exchanges’ from Greece and vice versa. By doing so, both countries are alienating the minorities and actually they lead them to seek assistance from outside, which of course perplexes even more the bilateral relations of these countries. Furthermore, in the case of Turkey I still insist that its attitude towards the minority and especially the Ecumenical Patriarchate is totally insane. The very reason I am suggesting this, is that actually it is for Turkey’s national interests to promote the Ecumenical Patriarchate. One the one hand this would make it easier to diminish its ‘Greek’ character in favor of its ‘ecumenicity’ and on the other hand Turkey would receive credentials as an example of a muslim country which respects minorities and is also the base of an international institution. The latter certainly would improve Turkeys profile as an EU candidate member state. During December 2009 the Turkish Ministry of Education announced that there is an ongoing process for the re-opening of the Greek Orthodox Theological School in Halki[4], an event which certainly is a positive one. However, I suggest that it was not the rapprochement process which helps the Patriarchate to improve its situation rather than the charismatic personality of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I. His international magnitude as well as his efforts against climate change ( The so called ‘Green’ Patriarch) and his role in order to open a dialogue with other Christian churches and Islam certainly created a lot of international pressure to Turkey in order to settle the issue[5].![Theological School of Halki](https://www.pastoralhealth-ep.com/images/halki.jpg)
![](https://3lyk-giann.pel.sch.gr/ekdilwseis/filologiko/eiriniki_zwi/panagia_soumela.jpg)